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Executive summary 
 
This policy brief analyses the key shortcomings of European Union (EU) cultural cooperation in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) South and proposes recommendations for reform. It looks at 
both the strategies and instruments in place. 
 
v Euro-Mediterranean cultural relations lack strategic thinking. While a great deal of attention is 
given to the Mediterranean within the nascent EU strategy for International Cultural Relations 
(ICR), a region-specific plan is still missing. Also, culture does not seem to be at the heart of either 
the EU Global Strategy or the latest ENP review, and therefore its role in EU’s external action and 
relative importance vis-à-vis other foreign policy tools remain unclear. 
v Partially because of this lack of strategies and coherence, several challenges affect the practice 
of EU support for culture in the region. Most EU initiatives are based on a donor-recipient 
relationship with target countries, making it difficult to establish co-created spaces for cultural 
cooperation. Also, EU-financed programmes remain short-termed in nature, thus failing to give to 
southern cultural actors the certainty of continuous support, which would strengthen their 
independence and political clout vis-à-vis their governments. Finally, programmes are endowed 
with resources that are not proportional to the ambitious objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership.  
 
For these reasons, the EU should: 
 
v Under the leadership of EEAS, better incorporate culture into the EU’s overall foreign policy 
objectives and give it more relevance therein. This process should also give greater centrality to 
the role of the Cultural Diplomacy Platform in the definition of the strategy on ICR.  
v In cooperation with DG NEAR (so far marginal in the debate on ICR), draft a region-specific plan 
for culture in the ENP South. This should be defined in close consultation with the governments 
and cultural sector in partner countries, through ‘trialogues’ that can rely either on pre-existing 
fora (e.g. the Union for the Mediterranean) or on new specific ones to be set up by the European 
Commission. A key component of this region-specific approach should overcome a donor-
recipient relationship by foreseeing a stronger strategic and financial contribution of southern 
partners. 
v Seek stronger co-ownership with other actors with a regional relevance, by stepping up cultural 
cooperation with regional organisations (e.g. the League of Arab States), enhancing joint actions 
with EU member states and their cultural institutes and ensuring coordination with other 
international donors (e.g. Ford Foundation, Open Society Foundations, DOEN Foundation). 
v Close the gap between the limited available means and the ambitious stated objectives of 
supporting intercultural dialogue, cohesion and stability as well as political, social and economic 
development in the region by, on the one hand, devoting more financial resources to cultural 
cooperation and, on the other hand, identifying realistic objectives. For example, building upon the 
experience of Med Culture in Jordan, the EU should focus on the creation of a permanent dialogue 
between the cultural sector and national authorities in all ENP South countries. 
v Design longer-lasting funding instruments for culture in the next Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF). In the longer term, a system of stronger co-funding from participating countries should be 
envisaged, possibly taking as a model the new-born Partnership on Research and Innovation in 
the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA – 2018-2028) in the field of science.  
v Design funding instruments in close consultation with managers and cultural actors who have 
implemented previous EU programmes and projects, as well as with civil society and the 
independent cultural sector in partner countries, trying to follow up on the incorporation of their 
concerns in future programmes. 
 3 
Euro-Mediterranean cultural relations: still waiting for a coherent strategy  
The EU has a long-standing experience in supporting culture in its Southern Neighbourhood, based on 
the third chapter of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration establishing a ‘partnership in social, cultural and 
human affairs’1. The specific importance of culture in fostering dialogue and cooperation within the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership has been stated multiple times in the past decades. Also, the process 
of policy formulation concerning culture in EU external relations started with the 2007 EC 
Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world2 and leading to the 2016 Joint 
Communication Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations3 dedicated a great deal of 
attention to the Mediterranean, in particular with regard to the need for intercultural dialogue with the 
Arab world in an historical phase of rising insecurities and religious radicalisation. Interestingly, the 
2018 EC Communication on A New European Agenda for Culture, which focused on ICR as one of its 
three strategic objectives, briefly stated that the EC and the High Representative will develop regional 
strategies for cultural cooperation, including on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)4. However, 
the potential timing for this was generically identified after the expected appointment of cultural focal 
points in EU delegations5, which has in itself an unclear deadline. Most importantly, the usefulness of 
designing a strategy targeting the whole MENA region, whose policy-specific boundaries will anyway 
need to be clarified, remains to be explained. This is especially true as ENP South countries are so far 
the only ones having a structured legal and political basis for cultural cooperation, which is mostly 
based on the legal framework of the ENP itself, with its own distinct assets and criticalities. The 
bilateral relations between EU and Gulf countries or Iran require completely different approaches than 
Euro-Mediterranean cultural cooperation as established in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and 
the ENP.   
In most cases, the constant mentioning of the Mediterranean in EU documents has been limited to 
praising the innovative initiatives taken by the EU and its partners in this region of the world – for 
instance the establishment of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue 
Between Cultures, the Euro-Mediterranean University of Slovenia and multiple financial programmes 
and fora – without putting them in a strategic perspective of future action or bringing them under a 
single and well-endowed institutional framework. Also, in these policy documents, the political, 
security and economic goals that are to be pursued through culture and intercultural dialogue have 
been disproportionate if compared to the resources invested. These goals include contribution to 
mutual understanding and bringing people closer together6, and helping stabilisation in ‘political 
tension, economic upheaval, violent radicalisation and migratory flows’7. 
Political leadership and strategic guidance in Euro-Mediterranean cultural relations are neither strong 
nor coherent. At the regional level, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) remains a ‘light’ multilateral 
arrangement without own financial capacity and limiting itself to ‘label’ regional projects that are 
funded by other actors: predominantly the EU, UfM member states, International Organisations, 
private foundations and others. While the 2008 Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Culture 
in Athens laid down optimistic priorities for Euro-Mediterranean cultural cooperation, ten years after 
this meeting a new one is nowhere in sight, and political and cultural divergences between countries 
in the region often curtail cultural cooperation at the regional level. A representative example of the 
                                                            
 
1 ‘Barcelona declaration’, adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, Barcelona, 27-28 January 1995, 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf.  
2 EC (2007) Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world, COM(2007) 242 final, Brussels, 10 May 
2007. 
3 EC and HR (2016) Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations, JOIN(2016) 29 final, Brussels, 8 June 2016. 
4 EC (2018) A New European Agenda for Culture, COM(2018) 267 final, Brussels, 22 May 2018, p. 8. 
5 EC (2018a) Staff Working Document accompanying COM (2018) 267 final, SWD(2018) 167 final, Brussels, 22 May 2018, 
p.18.  
6 Barcelona Declaration, op. cit., p. 7. 
7 EC and HR (2016), op. cit., p. 6. 
 4 
way in which long-standing political tensions can affect cultural cooperation appeared in 2017, when 
Israel decided to pull back from Creative Europe, the main EU funding programme for culture, because 
of the potential exclusion from financing of cultural projects based in settlements of West Bank, East 
Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights8.  
In most recent years, a positive sign of political leadership has come from an inter-regional forum. 
The first 5+5 Dialogue Culture Ministers Meeting took place in Tunis on 10 February 2017, including 
high-level observers from the Arab Maghreb Union, the Anna Lindh Foundation, the EU and the UfM. 
The meeting issued a ‘Tunis Declaration’ endorsing the launch of a segment on culture for the 5+5 
dialogue. The declaration sets ambitious priorities regarding the promotion of common values 
through ad-hoc policies and initiatives; policy dialogue; mobility of cultural actors; development of 
cultural and creative industries; support for initiatives in audio-visual, literature, protection of cultural 
heritage; involvement of civil society and youth based on the experience of actors like the Anna Lindh 
Foundation and programmes like Creative Europe, and more9. However, the extent to which these 
words will be followed by action is unclear, and the current low level of co-financing by southern 
partners and the related absence of real co-created Euro-Mediterranean cultural programmes in the 
framework of regional or inter-regional arrangements10 suggest that this might be once again a 
declaratory exercise.  
The lack of leadership and strategy in the field of culture is accompanied by an equally problematic 
neglect of culture in the main documents framing EU external action both globally and in the 
neighbourhood. On the one hand, the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security 
Policy, presented in the same month of the Joint Communication on ICR, only mentions cultural 
diplomacy once and in a generic way, suggesting that it does not represent a central aspect of EU 
global engagement11. Additionally, the Communication on the 2015 Review of the ENP, which guides the 
EU’s future relations with its neighbours, only mentioned culture in the context of intercultural 
dialogue to support the EU’s security concerns on issues of radicalisation and migration12. The ENP 
review is also ambiguous when considering cultural cooperation in the framework of broader EU 
support for civil society in its Southern Neighbourhood. In fact, the ENP review seems to constitute a 
step back in this regard, putting emphasis on stabilisation and good relations with southern 
governments – which are mostly authoritarian and enforcing a shrinking space for civil society – at 
the expense of democratic transformation13. This is particularly worrisome for the cultural sector, 
which is traditionally independent and reluctant to sing the official government tunes and is targeted 
with repression and censorship in many countries in the region. The uncomfortable role of the EU is 
visible in countries like Egypt, where EU-funded projects and associations (including the Anna Lindh 
Foundation) have to deal with strict government control, restriction on foreign funding to local 
organisations and even outright hostility, while the EU itself tries to foster amicable relations with 
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s illiberal and autocratic presidency. 
Finally, but also importantly, EU cultural action in the Mediterranean takes place in a context where 
multiple donors and other supporting actors operate, some in close coordination with the EU (e.g. 
                                                            
 
8 Perlson, H. (2017) Israeli Government Backtracks on ‘Creative Europe’ Funding Program. Artnet News. 31 January 2017, 
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/israeli-government-creative-europe-funding-program-837713.  
9 Agence Afrique Tunis Presse (2017) ‘Tunis Declaration’: Call for implementing co-operation programmes in all cultural fields, 
https://www.tap.info.tn/en/Portal-Culture-and-Media/8700939--tunis   
10 See Trobbiani, R. (2017) EU Cultural Diplomacy in the MENA Region: A Qualitative Mapping of Initiatives Promoting 
Regional Cooperation, EL-CSID Working Paper Issue 2017/2, https://www.ies.be/node/4072. 
11 Higgott, R. and Van Langenhove, L. (2016) Towards an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations: An Initial, Critical 
but Constructive Analysis. EL-CSID Policy Brief Issue 2016/1, 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/0bc3be_261d8b4db5344a11abdce75250c5eb54.pdf. 
12 EC and HR (2015) Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN(2015) 50 final, Brussels, 18 November 2015. 
13 Schumacher, T. (2016) Back to the Future: The new' ENP Towards the Southern Neighbourhood and the End of Ambition. 
CEPOB 1.16, College of Europe, Bruges, https://www.coleurope.eu/system/files_force/research-paper/schumacher_cepob_1-
16.pdf?download=1. 
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UNESCO, other UN agencies, Council of Europe), some in growing coordination but still pursuing their 
own goals (e.g. EU member states and their cultural institutes, some European and Arab foundations), 
some in parallel and at times in competition with EU activities (e.g. some private foundations, funds 
and development agencies from US, China and Gulf Countries). Taking into account the role of these 
actors and strengthening cooperation to avoid duplication of efforts and confusion on the side of 
recipient organisations should be fundamental aspects of future EU strategies. 
In brief, EU support for cultural initiatives in its Southern Neighbourhood needs a region-tailored 
strategic approach focused primarily on regional and secondarily on bilateral cooperation. Also, it 
necessitates stronger political backing to gain centrality within EU foreign policy objectives and 
become a topic on the table of regional and bilateral high-level politics. These shortcomings clash 
with the high security stakes dictated by the perception of cultural and religious differences between 
Europe and the Arab world, and with the many unresolved disputes between – and within – states in 
the region. The Arab revolts in 2011 have shown the need to revive the third chapter of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership, within the broader effort of putting political goals back at the centre of 
regional cooperation. The EU has developed a limited response and now seems to retreat on concerns 
of short-term political stability. Instead, it should increasingly focus on support for a stronger civil 
society serving longer-term security and peace in the region, to which the cultural sector and culture 
as such should contribute significantly. 
 
Strengthening and reforming the instruments of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation  
 
Especially since the late 1990s, cultural cooperation between the EU and Southern Mediterranean 
countries has been supported by the establishment of regional and bilateral programmes. Also, 
culture in a broad sense has been funded transversally by multiple EU instruments dealing with 
development assistance (Development and Cooperation Instrument), human rights (European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights), peace (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace), 
cross-border cooperation (CBC) and more14. Different phases of regional programmes like ‘Euromed 
Heritage’ (1998-2013), ‘Euromed Audiovisual’ (2000-2014), and ‘Euromed Youth’ (1999-2016) sought 
to create a regional dimension for cooperation in different domains of broadly-defined culture, with a 
growing attention to capacity-building and the creation of networks among cultural actors. More 
recent regional programmes created under ENPI/ENI also in response to the Arab revolts, namely 
‘Media and culture for development in the Southern Mediterranean’ (2014-2017 – €17 million) and 
‘MedFilm’ (created in 2015 – €5.3 million), build upon these experiences, targeting both governments 
and cultural actors with a long-term vision of development and empowerment of the cultural sector. 
Inter alia, the project ‘Med Culture’ aims to bring together cultural stakeholders and governments to 
design national strategies for culture – which is most successfully being done in Jordan – and 
achieve long-term development of the cultural sector15. At the same time, EU-funded projects and 
other EU-backed initiatives have created spaces for networking, exchange, project development and 
policy dialogue among cultural actors in the region and civil society at large, a notable example of 
which is the Mediterranean Forum of the Anna Lindh Foundation.  
 
However, the EU regional response to the Arab revolts has been quite limited, and the future of regional 
programmes seems uncertain altogether. Future instruments are being defined in the ongoing 
negotiations concerning the next MFF, including a new phase of Med Culture with an emphasis on 
civil society support16. So far, a clear gap remains between the stated ambitions that the EU and its 
Southern Mediterranean partners have put on the shoulders of culture and the little means at the 
                                                            
 
14 See Helly, D., Galeazzi, G. (2017) Mapping of EU funding for culture in the ENP, European Commission, Brussels, 
http://ecdpm.org/publications/mapping-eu-funding-culture-enp/.  
15 See Med Culture (2018) A strategic action plan for culture in Jordan, https://www.medculture.eu/information/press-
releases/med-culture-accompanies-steps-define-strategic-action-plan-culture-jordan.  
16 See EC (2018a), op. cit., p. 15.  
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disposal of this sectoral cooperation. While constituting a rich set of experiences to build upon, 
regional programmes also show the limits of EU cooperation in culture. These have a predominant 
focus on North-South exchanges and cooperation, while the regional character of South-South 
cooperation is often faced with the social, cultural and political diversity and divergences of countries 
in the region, which not always allow for a one-size-fits-all approach, and have at times required the 
redefinition of the methods employed to the detriment of a regional dimension17.  
 
Similarly, what has been witnessed in recent years is a partial shift of attention from regional to 
bilateral instruments. These engage cooperative local governments and cultural stakeholders as well 
as European actors which have the resources to implement EU programmes missing within EU 
Delegations – notably EU member states, their cultural institutes, and their European Union National 
Institutes for Culture network (EUNIC). Large bilateral programmes are currently being implemented 
in Tunisia (‘Programme d’Appui au Secteur de la Culture en Tunisie’ – €6 million) including a EUNIC-
implemented project, and Egypt (‘Support to Cultural Diversity and Creativity in Egypt’ – €3.6 million), 
and other were funded in the past in Algeria (‘Programme for the protection and valorisation of cultural 
heritage in Algeria’ – €24 million of which 21,5 from EU budget and 2,5 from Algeria). However, while 
allowing for more country-specific approaches in line with the 2015 ENP review’s stronger 
differentiation, these programmes should be seen as complementing rather than substituting regional 
cooperation, and are still affected by problems concerning EU cultural action in general. 
 
First, the short-termed nature of EU instruments leaves cultural actors in a state of uncertainty over 
the continuity of financial and technical support to their work and endangers the capacity of the EU 
to build upon its achievements in a long-term perspective. This is especially problematic in a political 
context where local governments are either non-supportive or even hostile to cultural actors, and the 
certainty of other sources of funding strengthen the political clout and negotiating position of the 
cultural sector.  
 
Second, the persistence of a strong donor-recipient relationship with target countries does not 
facilitate the creation of truly Euro-Mediterranean instruments for cooperation. The lack of interest of 
many southern governments in strong co-funding of cultural programmes and the tendency to look 
at the EU as a source of money rather than a partner hinder the effective co-design and co-ownership 
of initiatives. This becomes evident when it comes to programmes that are not based on unilateral 
aid and require a degree of financial and administrative commitment. For example, while Creative 
Europe, the main European programme for culture, is formally open to ENP countries – the presence 
of an ‘entry ticket’ based on GDP size and (politically-sensitive) legal pre-conditions for access to its 
MEDIA Sub-programme constitute some of the reasons behind the fact that only one country in the 
ENP South partially participates (Tunisia). A similar lack of co-ownership is found in Erasmus +, where 
ENP countries have comfortably chosen to be ‘partner countries’ rather than fully contributing as 
‘programme countries’ as allowed by the Regulation establishing the instrument18.  
 
Third, and along the same lines, while there have been some achievements concerning the 
participation of government services and agencies from Southern Mediterranean partners in 
predominantly EU-funded initiatives, EU programmes are mostly designed in Brussels and need to 
better build upon the experience of both local and European actors who have implemented previous 
instruments. In order to tailor its action to local needs, the EU strives to involve civil society in the 
design and evaluation of programmes. However, there are also shortcomings in this respect, and it 
has been suggested that beyond initial formal consultations the EU fails to follow-up on how the 
                                                            
 
17 See e.g. EuroMed Youth (2016) EuroMed Youth IV final Publication, p. 27,  
http://www.euromedyouth.net/IMG/pdf/euromed_youth_iv_-_final_publication.pdf.  
18 Perilli, A. (2017) Erasmus student or EU ambassador? People-to-people contact in the European Neighbourhood policy: the 
cases of Georgia, Ukraine and Tunisia, Bruges Political Research Papers 59 / 2017, College of Europe, Bruges, pp. 30-31, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/92488/.  
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opinion of local civil society is incorporated in its actions19. For a long-lasting development of the 
cultural sector in the Southern Mediterranean to take place, the EU should step up policy ‘trialogues’ 
with governments and civil society on culture, strengthening this component in both bilateral and 
regional cooperation.  
 
Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
While arguably being the region that has attracted most resources and attention from the EU in the 
cultural domain, the Mediterranean still calls for a more coherent and better-endowed framework for 
cultural cooperation. This is particularly true given its centrality among the EU’s recent political 
concerns. Coherently with the EU’s vision of a stronger cultural sector and intercultural dialogue as 
instruments for social cohesion, peace, democratisation, economic, political and social development 
– a long-term vision for Euro-Mediterranean cultural relations is needed. For this to happen, EU 
strategies and instruments need to be reformed. This overhaul of EU policies should be based on 
changed assumptions concerning the roles played by the EU and its southern partners as cultural 
actors. The EU should stop presenting itself as a donor and seek for more co-ownership in the design 
and financing of cultural programmes. Similarly to the broader reformed ENP, the challenge behind 
this shift is involving Southern Mediterranean governments without giving up conditionality on issues 
of freedom of the cultural sector, independence of civil society from political and religious power, 
gender equality and more. In the context of cultural relations, this should be done by investing more 
in policy dialogue and by bringing together local governments and the cultural sector for the design 
of national strategies. Also, more financial and human resources need to be dedicated to cultural 
cooperation in order to bring action in line with the stated objectives, and longer-term instruments 
need to be designed.  
 
The EU should act both at the level of strategies and instruments.  
 
Strategies:  
 
• The nascent strategy for ICR, strongly focused on the Mediterranean, should be better integrated 
with EU foreign policy objectives and given more relevance therein. For this to happen, a stronger 
leadership of the EEAS in mainstreaming culture in external policies is needed. This process 
should take into account the existing experience of design and implementation of EU and member 
states’ programmes and projects, by giving greater relevance to the role of the Cultural Diplomacy 
Platform in the definition of the strategy.  
• Within this process, a specific plan for the ENP South should be drafted. This could be 
incorporated in but should remain distinct from a broader MENA strategy,  as the uniqueness of 
the ENP political and legal framework for cooperation and the specificities of Euro-Mediterranean 
relations and common challenges do not allow for a one-size-fits-all approach. DG NEAR, so far 
relatively silent in debates concerning ICR, should take a stronger role in this. Clearer goals should 
be defined for cultural cooperation by focusing on realistic objectives to be endowed with 
sufficient resources. For example, building upon the experience of Med Culture in Jordan and 
some bilateral projects20 the EU should focus on the creation of a permanent dialogue between 
the cultural sector and national authorities in all ENP South countries, strengthening the technical 
and human capacities of the latter and guiding these actors towards the design of national 
strategies.  
                                                            
 
19 See EPLO (2013) Meeting Report: Civil Society Dialogue Network Meeting European Union – League of Arab States 
cooperation and the EU response to changes in the Arab region: Views from civil society, Valletta, 1-2 June 2013, 
http://eplo.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ EPLO_CSDN_meeting_EU-LAS_Report.pdf. 
20 For example, the EUNIC-implemented project ‘Towards a policy for the creative economy of Egypt’ (2018-2019 – €120,000), 
which seeks to establish a dialogue between the government and cultural stakeholders to support the creative economy of 
the country.  
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• This region-specific strategy should be defined in close consultation with the governments and 
cultural sector in the Southern Mediterranean, through ‘trialogues’ that can rely either on pre-
existing fora (e.g. the UfM) or on new specific fora set up by the European Commission. The EU’s 
narrative in this dialogue should especially focus on the great potential of culture for job creation 
and economic development in general, rather than on its own security concerns. Attention should 
be given to the need to enhance the South-South dimension as part of a stronger regional 
cooperation. In this framework, a new meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers 
of Culture, last held in 2008, constitutes a fundamental step.  
• Stronger co-ownership should also be sought with other actors with a regional relevance, trying 
to step up cultural cooperation with regional organisations (e.g. the League of Arab States) but 
also ensuring coordination with other actors that are financing culture in the region, including 
international private foundations and funds based in Arab countries.  
• A key component of this region-specific strategy should be overcoming a donor-recipient 
relationship by foreseeing a stronger financial contribution of southern partners in the creation of 
common programmes, based on their increased participation in defining the objectives of the 
policy. In this process, more emphasis should be placed on the mutually beneficial nature of a 
stronger cultural sector as a factor of economic development and social cohesion. 
 
Instruments: 
 
• In the preparation of the next MFF, longer-lasting funding instruments for culture should be 
foreseen, ideally moving towards the creation of a single regional programme to be renewed at 
every financial framework and periodically tailored to the changing needs of the cultural sector in 
Southern Neighbourhood countries. The EU should also dedicate more financial resources to 
regional cultural cooperation altogether, bringing the means in line with the ambitious stated 
objectives of supporting intercultural dialogue, cohesion and stability as well as political, social 
and economic development in the Mediterranean. With the current means, while is it possible to 
achieve some results in small countries like Tunisia or Jordan, it is unlikely to have any real impact 
on the cultural sector of a country like Egypt. 
• In the longer term, a system of stronger co-funding from participating countries should be 
envisaged, possibly taking as a model the new-born Partnership on Research and Innovation in 
the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA – 2018-2028) in the field of science. Similarly to PRIMA, where 
southern countries financially contribute to find jointly defined solutions to environmental and 
other factors depleting agro-food systems and water resources, a joint programme should present 
culture as a tool to address common social, economic and security challenges.  
• The design of the programmes should be based on a strong involvement of both managers and 
cultural actors who have implemented previous EU programmes and projects, as well as on a 
strong contribution of civil society and the independent cultural sector from southern countries, 
trying to follow up on the incorporation of their concerns. 
• Finally, financial and human resources at the disposal of EU delegations for cultural activities 
beyond pure communication and showcasing of European culture should be strengthened. The 
closer cooperation with member states and their cultural institutes foreseen by the administrative 
arrangement signed by EEAS, EUNIC and the EC in May 201721 should be endowed with specific 
financial means, in order to get the best out of their experience, resources and networks. 
 
                                                            
 
21 EEAS, EUNIC and EC (2017) Administrative arrangement for activities to be developed by the European Union National 
Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) in partnership with the European Commission Services and the European External Action 
Service, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/26249/national-institutes-culture-and-eu-further-
enhance-cooperation_en.  
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